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Abstract:  This paper, written for a conference volume on “post-Walrasian macro-
economimcs,” reviews what we have learned, and perhaps not learned, about the character 
of economic man over the last few decades, and discusses some of the macroeconomic 
implications of this research. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
 
Kevin Hoover (2004) has called David Colander the “Dante Gabriel Rossetti of the post-
Walrasian brotherhood,” but I prefer to think of him – and trust me, this is a compliment – 
as its Friedrich Engels.  In a series of manifestos advocating a post-Walrasian approach to 
macroeconomics, he calls for the replacement of the “holy trinity” (shades of Das Kaptial!) 
of neoclassical economics – namely, rationality, equilibrium and greed – with another based 
on purposeful behavior, institutions and complexity, and multiple equilibria.  (To be scrupulous, he 
does not use the word “neoclassical” – in his role as an historian of economic thought, he 
has even pronounced the term dead (Colander 2000)  – and, in recent versions of the 
manifesto, has substituted bounded rationality for purposeful behavior and/or sustainability for 
institutions.  But I am one of those heterodox economists who still finds the label useful and, 
while I have no doubt that post-Walrasian man is boundedly rational – who isn’t? – I am 
nevertheless uncomfortable, for reasons that should soon become clear, with at least this 
substitution.)  Recognizing that all memorable slogans obscure important details – there are 
few serious general equilibrium theorists, for example, for whom the existence of unique 
equilibria in “information rich environments” (Colander, Holt and Rosser 2003) is 
paradigmatic, for example – the question remains:  are these the watchwords that post-
Walrasians want? 
  Hoover (2004), who is (at the least) one of the brotherhood’s fellow travellers, is 
nevertheless concerned that Colander’s “beautiful words … are a kind of free verse” and 
that “[even if we do not] know more about the economy from hewing to the structures of 
Walrasian economics … there is something to be said for discipline.”  Whatever the virtues 
of such discipline – a problem better left to the Foucaultians among us – I want to argue 
that the concern itself is misplaced, that these “beautiful words,” which share some 
methodological (if not ideological) affinities with Sam Bowles and Herb Gintis’ (2000) 
characterization of economic man as homo reciprocans, need not produce intellectual chaos.  
Indeed, to judge from Colander’s (2003) own description of post-Walrasian macro policy as 
the “economics of muddling through” – another memorable catchphrase – it is possible that 
I sense more “order” than even he does, or for that matter wants.  In particular, it seems to 
me that we have learned much about the character of “post-Walrasian man,” the fraternal twin of homo reciprocans and the fourth cousin, seven times removed, of homo economicus – 
over the last decade or so, and that he is a purposeful actor whose preferences and actions 
cannot be separated from the other actors and institutions around him.  Furthermore, he is 
someone who is amenable to rigorous economic analysis. 
  Stepping back for a moment, however, it should be said that both old and 
new trinities presume that in some form or another, the “microfoundations project” is alive 
and well.  If all that post-Walrasian macroeconomists aspired to was the detection of robust 
patterns in aggregate data – an impression that some discussions of related econometric 
methods should do more to correct – the character of post-Walrasian man would not matter 
much, in the same sense that a chemist does not need to know much about molecules to 
(re)discover Boyle’s Law of Gases.  This does not mean that post-Walrasians will share the 
neoclassical enthusiasm for representative agent models:  the agent-based computational 
model of the labor market described in Giorgio Fagiolo, Giovanni Dosi and Roberto 
Gabriele (2004), for example, in which the Beveridge, Okun and wage curves are emergent 
properties, illustrates how broad, and ambitious, “bottom up economics” has become. 
To some critics on both left and right, this will seem a distinction without a 
difference.  To John Finch and Robert McMaster (2004), for example, the methodological 
individualism of Bowles and Gintis – and no doubt other post-Walrasians – is no less 
reductionist or ahistorical than their Walrasian counterparts.  And the critics have a point:  to 
paraphrase Gertude Stein, the laws of capitalist motion are the laws of capitalist motion are 
the laws of capitalist motion, with or without plausible microfoundations.  It is the dual 
premise of this paper, however, that (a) recent theoretical and computer-based advances 
hold considerable promise and (b) if there are microfoundations to be built, it is post-
Walrasian man, not homo economicus, who will animate them. 
So who, then, is post-Walrasian man? 
It is perhaps easier to start with who he is not, and no one has ever provided a more 
eloquent description than Thorstein Veblen, a post-Walrasian before his time.  In “Why Is 
Economics Not An Evolutionary Science” (1898: 389), he wrote: 
 
In all the received formulations of economic theory … the human material 
with which the inquiry is concerned is conceived in hedonistic terms; that is 
to say, in terms of a passive and substantially inert and immutably given human nature. 
The psychological and anthropological preconceptions of the economists have been those which were accepted by the psychological and social 
sciences some generations ago. The hedonistic conception of man is that of a 
lightning calculator of pleasures and pains who oscillates like a homogeneous 
globule of desire of happiness under the impulse of stimuli that shift him 
about the area, but leave him intact. He has neither antecedent nor 
consequent. He is an isolated definitive human datum, in stable equilibrium except for 
the buffets of the impinging forces that displace him in one direction or another. Self-
imposed in elemental space, he spins symmetrically about his own spiritual 
axis until the parallelogram of forces bears down upon him, whereupon he 
follows the line of the resultant. When the force of the impact is spent, he 
comes to rest, a self-contained globule of desire as before. Spiritually, the 
hedonistic man is not a prime mover. He is not the seat of a process of living, 
except in the sense that he is subject to a series of permutations enforce 
upon him by circumstances external and lien to him.  (389, emphasis added) 
 
 
In contrast, post-Walrasian man is first and foremost not “an isolated human datum” but is 
instead someone who is embedded in various networks, whose interactions with other members 
of these networks, which both reflect and are reflected in the institutions that inform these 
interactions, mean that he can be neither “passive” nor “inert.”  
  Charles Manski (2000) distinguishes three broad categories of interaction, reflecting 
the channels through which an individual’s actions affect one another.  Constraint interactions, 
like the standard positive and negative externalities, are not especially post-Walrasian:  
neoclassical (and other) economists have considered their consequences – not least of which 
is their relationship to multiple equilibria in macroeconomics – for decades.  This said, post-
Walrasians do not discount constraint interactions, either. 
  Post-Walrasians are also not alone in their insistence that learning, Manski’s (2000) 
archetypal example of the expectations interaction, is an essential feature of economic life.  In 
more provocative terms, most post-Walrasians are (or should be) prepared to consider 
models in which learning dynamics, rather than some definition of equilibrium, is the 
primitive.  To mention one simple but striking example, we know that in some population 
games, imitation, one of the basic forms of learning, produces a replicator dynamic in pure 
strategies and that this sometimes leads to outcomes that fail the “backward induction test.”  
Kenneth Binmore, John Gale and Larry Samuelson (1995), for example, were the first to 
rationalize the observed behavior in ultimatum game experiments – offers are more fair, and 
unfair offers are rejected more often, than is consistent with subgame perfection – with such 
a model.   It is the third sort of social interaction,  preference interaction, that is most often 
identified with post-Walrasian accounts of economic man.  As Manski (2000) reminds us, 
such interactions are a central feature of non-cooperative games  – each individual’s 
preferences over the strategies available to him or her will depend on the strategies that 
others choose – but the post-Walrasian notion of “dependence” is even broader than this 
implies.  To the extent that post-Walrasian man adheres to certain norms or convention, is 
sensitive to conformist or other social pressures or exhibits emotion, for example – in short, 
to the extent that post-Walrasian man is human – the “map” from material outcomes to 
psychological ones, and therefore preference functions, will be more complicated than game 
theorists have too often supposed.  Indeed, if preference functions are defined over both 
outcomes and beliefs – the premise of psychological games, about which more below – the 
definition of preference interaction becomes more expansive still. 
  I still have not said much about the character of post-Walrasian man – if he is not 
Veblen’s “homogenous globule of desire,” who is he? – and the easiest, if not the best, to 
observe him “in action” is in the lab … 
     
2.  The View From The Lab 
 
If Veblen is the madwoman is the post-Walrasian attic, Alfred Marshall is the movement’s 
popular if “frumpy Victorian” (Bowles and Gintis 2000: 1411) grandfather.  There is a 
distinct Marshallian flavor to much of the post-Walrasian enterprise, and its portrait of 
economic man is, or ought to be, no exception.  For post-Walrasians, the question is not 
“How might a hypothetical agent endowed with narrow self-interest behave in an idealized 
setting without meaningful interaction?” but rather “What ‘empirical regularities’ describe 
how individuals do behave in environments in which interaction matters?”  And while Jörgen 
Weibull’s [2004] claim that “moving from arm-chair theorizing to controlled lab experiments 
may be as important a step in the development of economic theory as it once was for the 
natural sciences to move from Aristotelian scholastic speculation to modern empirical 
science” is more than a little overzealous, there is no doubt that our current understanding 
of post-Walrasian man owes much to the contributions of experimentalists and (other) 
behavioralists.    Old school Keynesians, for whom discussions of  internal labor markets and/or 
“contested exchange” (Bowles and Gintis 1993) are often a distraction, will not be pleased, 
but consider the example of team production.  In its standard game theoretic representation, 
team production is a special case of the public goods problem, the quintessential “social 
dilemma.”  It is a robust feature of this game that for a wide range of experimental designs, 
including one shot and “stranger treatments,” subjects are more prosocial than is consistent 
with the standard interpretation of Nash equilibrium (John Ledyard 1995).  In the team 
production context, workers expend more effort, and free ride the effort of others less, than 
homo economicus would.  Furthermore, in experiments that allow subjects to monitor and then 
punish one another, subjects both contribute and are prepared to sanction, at considerable 
cost to themselves, those who do not contribute their “fair share,” behavior that seems at 
odds with subgame perfection, the relevant equilibrium refinement (Ernst Fehr and Simon 
Gächter 2000).  Furthermore, those who are punished tend to alter their behavior – that is, 
contribute more  – and, as Jeff Carpenter (2002) has shown, the willingness to punish, 
however “rational,” exhibits some Marshallian regularities, not least of which is a well-
behaved demand curve.  As the “price of punishment” rises, for example, experimental 
subjects spend less on punishment, controlling for the size of the “offense,” and so on. 
  In the language of Bowles and Gintis (1998), the evidence from both experiments 
and artificial life simulations is that, at least in this context, the preferences of post-Walrasian 
man are often nice, punishing and forgiving.  He is nice in the sense that he is co-operative in the 
earliest stages of economic relationships that reward co-operation, but punishing in the sense 
that, consistent with the existence of powerful norms, he will sanction antisocial behavior 
even at some cost to himself.  He is also forgiving, however, because the desire to punish 
dissolves when antisocial behavior is abandoned.  Furthermore, these preferences serve post-
Walrasian man well:  if a sufficient number of those he interacts with have similar 
preferences, he will even do better, in material terms, than homo economicus.  A specimen of homo 
economicus worth his salt would in this case either become, or pretend to become, post-
Walrasian!  And the logic is not limited to public goods games:  the simple tit-for-tat rule that 
won Robert Axelrod’s (1984) infamous prisoner’s dilemma tournament was also nice, 
punishing but forgiving.  
  To distinguish the behavior observed in these experiments from either altruism or 
“reciprocal altruism”  – the form of enlightened but still narrow self-interest that sociobiologists favor – Bowles and Gintis (2000) the term strong reciprocity.  In our own 
subsequent work, Jeff Carpenter and I have coined the term social reciprocity to describe the 
“third party norm enforcement” in which experimental subjects punish free riders within 
and across groups (Carpenter and Matthews 2004).  To motivate the experiment, we also 
conducted a survey that asked respondents about various team production scenarios, and 
found that a substantial number were prepared (or at least claimed to be) to sanction 
violations of production norms in other teams.  Our results, and those of Fehr and Gächter 
(2004), suggest that norms about antisocial behavior are broader, or that group boundaries 
are more fluid, than once believed.  In more prosaic terms, whether or not “it takes a 
village,” post-Walrasian villagers make it easier. 
(For those interested in the possible macroeconomic implications of this research, 
consider one that has not received much attention to date.  The team production experiments 
hint that the relationship between compensation schemes and output per worker is more 
complicated than Walrasian models predict.  And while economists have been interested for 
decades (Martin Weitzman 1984, for example) in how different schemes alter the 
propagation of macroeconomic shocks, the economic actors who inhabit this literature are 
the traditional ones.) 
  I have hinted once or twice that the preferences of post-Walrasian man are context- 
and perhaps process-specific, and the most transparent evidence of this comes from the 
experimental literature on  framing effects.  At the risk of engaging in some unseemly 
boosterism, let me mention a homegrown example.  In his senior thesis here at Middlebury, 
Victor Guzik (2004) was able to show that behavior in three otherwise identical common 
pool resource games when the experiment was framed as an exercise in workplace relations, 
natural resource use and a simple parlor game.  In this case, and dozens of others, 
differences in (even) verbal cues have been shown to produce significant differences in 
behavior, a result that is difficult to reconcile with standard representations of economic 
man. 
  From a labor perspective, however, the most important variation in context is that 
from worker/worker to worker/firm interaction.  (There are of course more fundamental 
strategic differences as well.)  It should first be noted, therefore, that reciprocal behavior is 
sometimes manifest in worker/firm experiments.  Ernst Fehr, Simon Gächter and Georg 
Kirchsteiger’s (1996) much cited paper found, for example, that even with random matching and no effort enforcement mechanism, workers and firms “traded” more effort for higher 
wages, consistent with George Akerlof and Janet Yellen’s (1990) gift exchange model.  For 
macroeconomists, the norm that seems to drive this behavior – “a fair day’s work for a fair 
day’s pay” – has important consequences, not least of which is one explanation (Akerlof and 
Yellen 1990) of persistent involuntary unemployment.  The results of this and other similar 
experiments have also been used to rationalize Truman Bewley’s (1999) findings that despite 
their real wage equivalence, workplace morale suffers more when nominal wages are cut than 
when the price level rises, a partial vindication of Keynes’ much criticized views on wage 
determination.  ( One is tempted to speculate that this reflects Marshall’s considerable 
influence – in particular, the interest in the “psychological propensities” of economic man – 
on Keynes.) 
  This does not mean, however, that the existence of “nice” preferences are the basis 
for a complete description of worker/firm interaction.  Without obscuring the differences 
that separate self-identified post-Walrasians – at this point, the post-Walrasian tent is still a 
big one – it seems to me that without explanations for the conflict, opportunism and power 
that sometimes characterize this interaction, the tent will soon start to sag. 
  For those who are concerned that a focus on power will somehow “radicalize” the 
post-Walrasian movement, Oliver Hart’s (1995) argument that economic power exists when 
complete contracts are not feasible is an alternative point of departure, one that dovetails 
well with Colander’s (2003) judgment that post-Walrasian man operates in “information 
poor environments.”  It is a small step from here to Carl Shapiro and Joseph Stiglitz’s (1984) 
characterization of equilibrium unemployment – or, for those who would prefer a more 
radical face, the existence of a reserve army – as a “worker discipline device” in a world 
where effort is difficult to monitor.  Viewed from this perspective, Bowles and Gintis’ (1993, 
2000) interest in the existence of short side power in competitive (labor or credit) markets is an 
important contribution to the post-Walrasian literature. 
  Unlike the gift exchange paradigm, however, which has inspired dozens, if not 
hundreds, of experiments, the empirical literature on contested exchange is thin.  Fehr, 
Kirchsteiger and Arno Reidl (1996), which concludes that all of the core predictions of the 
Shapiro-Stiglitz model are observed in experimental labor markets, is the most notable 
exception.   These results also illustrate the considerable reach of experimental methods, a 
benefit that post-Walrasian macroeconomists should (continue to) exploit.  As Armin Falk 
and Fehr (2003) observe in their “Why Labor Market Experiments?” it can be difficult, and 
sometimes impossible, to demonstrate the existence of the rents embodied in labor 
discipline models because of unobserved heterogeneities and (other) measurement 
difficulties.  And while economists’ newfound interest in survey data has produced some 
important insights, it is not clear how much light such data can shed on “effort extraction 
problem.”  The observation that the human resources directors and others interviewed in 
Bewley (1999) professed to prefer “carrots” over “sticks,” for example, is more difficult to 
interpret than first seems.  Even if one abstracts from the problem of “survey bias” – What 
firm would admit, even to itself, that it threatens its workers? – the Shapiro-Stiglitz model 
predicts that in equilibrium, the threat of dismissal is never exercised.  In more prosaic terms, 
it is difficult to reconcile such data with the fact that at this moment, there are hundreds, if 
not thousands, of cartoon strips featuring Catbert, the “evil HR Director” in Scott Adams’ 
Dilbert, thumbtacked to office cubicles across America.  Subject to legitimate concerns about 
external validation, about which more below, it seems a safe bet that over the next decade or 
two, a substantial number of the Marshall regularities that describe the post-Walrasian 
worker will first be documented in the lab. 
  The focus on labor-related experiments to this point should not be construed to 
mean that post-Walrasians should limit their attention to these.  And while it was almost 
inevitable that macroeconomists would be slower to embrace experimental methods than 
others, there is now considerable interest in them.  The literature has become both broad 
and rich enough, in fact, that I shall do no more than mention a few contributions of 
particular interest to post-Walrasians, and urge interested readers to consult Colin Camerer 
and George Loewenstein’s (2004) overview of the related literature in behavioral 
macroeconomics, and the references therein. 
  John Duffy and Eric O’N. Fisher (2004), for example, have found the first  direct 
evidence of sunspot equilibria in the lab, an important result that is consistent with the post-
Walrasian emphases on multiple equilibria and, somewhat less prominent, on extrinsic or 
non-fundamental uncertainty as a co-ordination mechanism.  John Hey and Daniela di 
Cagno (1998), on the other hand, provide experimental support for Clower’s dual-decision 
model.  Neither experiment, however, tells us much new about the character of post-Walrasian man,  unlike, for example, those of Eldar Shafir, Peter Diamond and Amos 
Tversky (1997) or Fehr and Jean-Robert Tryan (2001), which suggests that post-Walrasian 
macroeconomists should not be as eager as their Walrasian brethren to renounce the 
“heresy” of money illusion:  real and nominal frames, it seems, elicit different behaviors.  
There is also experimental evidence that post-Walrasian man creates “mental accounts” 
(Richard Thaler 1991) to organize some kinds of economic information, is often loss averse 
(Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman 1991) and discounts future outcomes at hyperbolic 
rates (Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein and Ted O’Donoghue 2002), with important 
consequences for intertemporal decisions. 
 
3.  The View From the Theorist’s Office 
 
Returning to the team production example for a moment, it is reasonable to wonder what 
the theorist might contribute to the conversation.  Aren’t some sort of altruistic preferences 
sufficient to explain the otherwise anomalous contribution levels and doesn’t this mean that 
post-Walrasian man is just homo economicus with a few more arguments in his preference 
function?  And wouldn’t another argument or two, intended to model the “taste for 
revenge,” also explain punishment?  To the certain relief of theorists, the answer to all three 
questions is no.  As Bowles and Gintis (2000) observe, the experimental evidence suggests 
that strong reciprocators are not outcome-oriented but do condition on norm adherence, 
neither of which is consistent with simple altruism or, for that matter, “enlightened self-
interest.”  Furthermore, no combination of altruism and revenge can explain both the 
outgroup punishment that we (Carpenter and Matthews 2004) observed in our own 
experiments and the in/outgroup punishment differential.  And last, to paraphrase Matthew 
Rabin (1993), the simple transformation of material outcomes in experimental (or other) 
games on the basis of altruistic preferences is overdeterministic:  “bad equilibria” are often 
eliminated in the process, which runs counter to the post-Walrasian notion that economic 
environments (often) have multiple equilibria in which the “selection problem” cannot be 
dismissed. 
  For the theorist, then, the representation of prosocial preferences is not a trivial 
exercise.  Furthermore, he or she should then be able to rebut the “as if” argument that 
neoclassicals have used, to great rhetorical effect, ever since Armen Alchian (1950):  wouldn’t some sort of “natural selection” weed out those who contribute rather than free 
ride, who expend personal resources on norm enforecement, who do not behave, in other 
words, “as if” endowed with self-interested preferences?  (To be fair, this is a bowdlerized 
version of Alchian’s (1950) argument.  On other hand, so are most other versions, not least 
those to which students are often introduced.)  As it turns out, the answer is once more no.  
The emergence of reciprocal behavior in team production or public goods games, whether 
strong or social, can be rationalized in terms of an evolutionary dynamic based on the 
vertical and/or lateral transmission of preferences.  I do not mean evolution in the sense that 
most sociobiologists do, however:  as Camerer and Loewenstein (2004, 40) observe, “we 
believe in evolution … but we do not believe that behavior of intelligent, modern people 
immersed in socialization and cultural influence can be understood only by guessing what 
their ancestral lives were like and how their brains might have adapted genetically.”  The 
establishment of prosocial preferences can be understood, in other words, as the product of 
gene-culture co-evolution (Bowles and Gintis 2000).  But it need not be.  In our work on social 
reciprocity (Carpenter and Matthews 2004) it is a simple learning model that drives the laws 
of motion.  (There is in fact considerable debate about what “evolution” should – and 
should not – mean in economics, but almost no disagreement that the preferences of post-
Walrasian man are sustainable.) 
  Because strict Nash equilibria will also be stable under most dynamics, it comes as no 
surprise that for some initial conditions, behavior in the team production game will tend 
toward no contribution/no punishment.  For the reasons mentioned earlier, however, post-
Walrasians should see this as a desirable feature of the model. 
The t heory of psychological games, the invention of John Geanakoplos, David 
Pearce and Ennio Stachetti (1989), provides another perspective on behavior in team 
production and other experiments.  Their premise, if not its implementation, is a simple one:  
utilities are allowed to be functions of both outcomes and (hierarchies of) coherent beliefs 
and in equilibrium, these beliefs are fulfilled.  As manifest in the more familiar work of Rabin 
(1993) and later behavioralists, the notion of a psychological Nash equilibrium was 
specialized and became the kindness (or reciprocal) equilibrium that is consistent with observed 
behavior in these experiments.  It was not until the recent work of Martin Dufwenberg and 
Georg Kirchsteiger (2004), however, that Rabin’s framework was extended to sequential 
games. The possible role of intention in psychological games, a feature that distinguishes this 
framework from more outcome-oriented models of social preferences, calls for particular 
attention from post-Walrasians.  Experimentalists have known for some time that intention 
matters:  Sally Blount’s (1995) much-cited paper, for example, shows that rejection rates in 
ultimatum games are significantly higher when (human) responders believe the proposals to 
be computer-generated.  For macroeconomists, an awareness of intention could contribute 
to a better understanding of wage and price rigidities.  As the work of Daniel Kahneman, 
Jack Knetsch and Richard Thaler (1990) reminds us, for example, the firm that sells bottled 
water to hurricane victims is perceived to be unfair – and in some jurisdictions, prosecuted 
for price gouging – but one that increases its price because its costs have risen is not.  The 
surprise, as Camerer and Loewenstein (2004) observe, is how little macroeconomists have 
made of this observation.  In a similar vein, when I have sometimes asked non-economists, 
including students, to explain the “morale differential” between nominal wage reductions 
and price increases, the most common response is that the firm’s intentions make the former 
more “personal.” 
The notion of a psychological game is broader than Rabin’s (1993) specialized model 
hints, however, even if the literature devoted to alternative applications remains thin.  
Geanakoplos (1997) himself, for example, has proposed psychological game theoretic 
solutions to two outstanding problems in decision theory, the Hangman’s Paradox and 
Newcomb’s Paradox.  In principle, this framework can accommodate a post-Walrasian man 
who is sometimes surprised – an impossible state of mind, it should be added, in Walrasian 
models with a complete set of spot and future markets – or disappointed or even furious.  
Though much research remains to be done, it could also be consistent with prosocial 
behavior other than that manifest in a kindness equilibrium.  Furthermore, Rabin (1993) was 
careful to underscore that in the games he considered, the transformation of material 
outcomes is not “trivial” – that is, self-interested preferences are not replaced with altruistic 
ones – so that there are multiple psychological Nash equilibria.  If there is bad news here, it 
is that reliable field data on even first order beliefs are scarce, so that the burden of empirical 
research falls on the experimentalists. 
(As an historical aside, it is important that post-Walrasian macroeconomists 
recognize that the search for better psychological/behavioral microfoundations did not start 
with them.  Almost four decades ago, for example, James Tobin and Trenary Dolbear (1963, 679) lamented the fact that “economics has sought to be neutral with respect to the sources 
of preferences, but it has purchased this neutrality at the cost of substantive content” and 
provided several examples.  In the case of consumption, for example, “the disregard of 
social interdependence … contradict[ed] everyday observation as well as the presumptions 
of sociology and social psychology” (Tobin and Dolbear 1963, 679).  In fact, their call for 
the use of more, and better designed, surveys intended to link the psychological 
characteristics of respondents and their economic decisions still resonates.) 
For those who concede that homo economicus is not well, but are not prepared to bid 
him farewell, some if not most of the behavior in team production experiments is better 
explained as a quantal response equilibrium in which experimental subjects best respond to one 
another’s anticipated “trembles.”  Charles Holt and a number of co-authors have turned to 
stochastic game theory to rationalize all sorts of experimental anomalies, from behavior  in 
traveler’s dilemma, coordination and signaling games (Jacob Goeree and Charles Holt 2001) 
to the public goods game considered here (Simon Anderson, Jacob Goeree and Charles Holt 
1998).  Whether or not this research program should be considered post-Walrasian is 
perhaps a matter of taste.  On one hand, its economic actors are purposeful in the traditional 
(that is, Walrasian) sense of the word and are not boundedly rational per se  but instead self-
consciously nervous, homo economicus in need of a long vacation.  On the other hand, it would 
be foolish to insist that post-Walrasian never trembles or that he doesn’t know, even account 
for, this.  Furthermore, the equilibria of such models are the result of a particular sort of 
expectations-based social interaction. 
 
4.  The View From The Field 
 
To all of this the resolute Walrasian could still respond, “So what?”  A theoretical paradigm 
that broadens our sense of how rational economic actors could behave and the observation of 
such behavior in controlled – but sterile? – lab environments is not evidence, he will counter, 
that post-Walrasian man lives where it matters, in the wild.  Even the recent wave of “field 
experiments” has failed to convince the skeptics:  the fact that subjects outside the lab with 
(often) substantial amounts on the line exhibit the same behavior as their counterparts in the 
lab does not mean, it is sometimes said, that either will reach similar decisions in the hurly-
burly of everyday life.  To provide a concrete example, the fact that neither well-to-do undergraduates nor the much less affluent participants in the “fifteen small-scale societies” 
project (Joseph Henrich et al 2001) resemble homo economicus in public goods experiments 
does not mean that both will resist the temptation to free ride in the “real world.”  (Because 
I do not want to misrepresent the results of this exceptional achievement, I hasten to add 
that there were substantial differences across the fifteen societies.  In the Ache (Paraguay) 
and Tsimané (Bolivia) groups, for example, there were fewer free riders and fewer full co-
operators than in most North American or European subject pools, a reminder that the 
character of post-Walrasian man is not independent of his environment.) 
  One strict approach to external validation requires that behavior observed in 
experimental settings predict behavior or outcomes in non-experimental ones.  Given the 
practical difficulties involved, there are few examples of such tests, but the little evidence 
that does exist is encouraging.  Abigail Barr and Peter Serneels (2004), for example, find that 
for Ghanian manufacturing workers, experimental measures of reciprocal behavior were 
correlated with wages, ceteris paribus, but concede that it is not clear from the data in which 
direction the causal arrow points.  In a similar vein, Jeff Carpenter and Erika Sakei (2004) 
find that among the Japanese fishermen in Toyama Bay, the more prosocial individual crew 
members were in a public goods experiment with monitoring, the more productive their 
boat was, controlling for the size and speed of the boat, the number of crew members, the 
experience of the captain, and so on.  So while there is much work to be done – there are 
few studies of Western workers, for example – there is also reason to believe that it will bear 
post-Walrasian fruit. 
  But what about field data that does not come from an experiment and cannot be 
linked to one, the sort of data that applied econometricians are most familiar with?  Can 
social preferences or, in broader terms, interaction effects even be identified in such data?  
Few have done more to answer these questions – and in the process illuminate some of the 
shortcomings with standard interpretations of experimental data – than Charles Manski, 
whose initial statement of the reflection problem (Manski 1993) should be considered part of the 
post-Walrasian canon.  In it he distinguishes three broad categories of interaction effect – 
endogenous, contextual and correlated – and shows that in the linear-in-means model, a 
simple but natural specification, the endogenous effects in which post-Walrasians will be 
interested cannot be separated from contextual ones.  The intuition, as Manski (2000, 25) 
himself later described it, is that because “mean behavior in the group is itself determined by the behavior of group members … data on outcomes do not reveal whether group behavior 
actually affects individual behavior, or group behavior is simply the aggregation of individual 
behaviors.” 
  The immediate lesson for post-Walrasians is  not  that interaction effects are 
undetectable in non-experimental data.   For one thing, the reflection problem complicates 
the interpretation of experimental data too, a fact that experimentalists themselves have been 
(too) slow to appreciate.  But as the recent work of Michael Carter and Marco Castillo (2004) 
demonstrates, careful attention to experimental design allows such effects to be identified 
even in the linear-in-means model.  (For the record, Carter and Castillo do find evidence of 
“emulation effects” in field experiments conducted in 30 rural Honduran communities.)  
And a number of enterprising researchers have recognized that some natural experiments 
can facilitate identification:  Bruce Sacerdote’s (2001) much cited paper, for example, 
exploits the random assignment of roommates at Dartmouth College to demonstrate the 
existence of significant peer effects. 
Since the reflection problem was first posed, we have also learned that functional 
form  – in particular, the introduction of “reasonable nonlinearities”  – can solve the 
identification problem, at least in those cases where the researcher knows the boundaries of 
the reference group and its characteristics.  William Brock and Steven Durlauf (2001), for 
example, show that in discrete choice models with interaction effects, an extension of the 
logit model is a natural specification. 
Alas, even in those cases where the existence of some sort of interaction can be 
identified, the econometric models in Manski (2000) or Brock and Durluaf (2001) cannot tell 
us much about the source of the social multiplier.  For those interested in the character of 
post-Walrasian man, however, the difference between expectations-driven interactions and 
preference-driven ones is fundamental.  For this and other reasons, and despite all that has 
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